

My training is in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Much of my work focuses on phenomenal concepts, and the nexus of vagueness and consciousness. My dissertation (*The Sharp Contour of Consciousness*, NYU, 2012) argues that there can be no borderline cases of the concept PHENOMENALLY CONSCIOUS. I develop related ideas in “Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ Has No Borderline Cases” (*Phil Studies* 2017), “The Hard Problem of the Many” (*Phil Perspectives* 2017), “Mendelssohn, Kant and the Mereotopology of Immortality” (*Ergo* 2017), “Indeterminate Comprehension” (*Thought* 2014) and “What is Acquaintance with Consciousness?” (*Consciousness Inside and Out*, ed. R. Brown, Springer, 2014).

Currently, I am investigating metaphysical constraints on the neural formatting of experience. Can the neural code of experience be sensitive to spatial orientation, so that the mirror reflection of a neural state realizes a different experience than the state itself? Can the neural code of experience be sensitive to temporal direction, so that the neural spike pattern short-short-long realizes a different experience than long-short-short? The answers to these and related questions hinge on what we say about the metaphysics of space and the time-reversibility of physics. I address these questions in my works in progress “Experiencing Left and Right on a Non-Orientable Manifold”, winner of the 2018 Marc Sanders Prize in Mind (*Analytic Philosophy*, forthcoming), and “Temporal Coding and Time’s Arrow” (under review at *J-Phil*). I argue for a related point — a tension between the three-dimensionalist theory of time, and the two-minds theory of split-brain cases — in my “Fragmenting the Wave Function”, winner of second place in the 2017 Marc Sanders Prize in Metaphysics (*Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, forthcoming).

My research in this area also includes work on artificial consciousness; in particular the question of whether and under what conditions implementations of neural network algorithms may be conscious. I address this question in my works in progress, “What is it like to be AlphaGo?” (anticipated publication in *aeon.co*), and ‘What is the Refresh Rate of Consciousness?’

I also have a research project on the nature of affective experience. I defend evaluativism about affective experience, with a focus on pain. I have an R&R with *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* for “Painkillers for the Representationalist’s Headache: Transparency about Pain” in which I develop a transparency-friendly reply to the killing-the-messenger challenge to evaluativism about pain. On my account, pain gives us reason to take painkillers, because painkillers present as diminishing the badness that pain tells us about. Another work in progress is “Pain Ain’t Paint”

which considers the imaginative resistance we encounter in trying to imagine the inversion of affective experience (my pleasure being your pain, though we behave the same). The paper draws on recent work on action depersonalization and related disorders to argue that an adequate account of this imaginative resistance must appeal to phenomenal content in addition to phenomenal structure, which tells against the mental paint theory.

In pure metaphysics, my publications include the aforementioned “Fragmenting the Wave Function”, (*Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, forthcoming) and “Indeterminate Comprehension” (*Thought* 2014), as well as “The Protestant Theory of Determinable Universals” (In *Johanssonian Investigations*, 2014, a Festschrift for Ingvar Johansson), “Truthmaker Explanations” (co-authored with Barry Smith in *Truthmakers and Metaphysics*, ed. Monnoyer, Ontos, 2007, reprinted as “Explications Verificationalistes”, trans. Anne-Marie Boisvert, *Philosophiques* 2011) and “Is Time-Travel a Problem for the Three-Dimensionalist?” (*The Monist* 2007).

Finally, I have an ongoing interest in questions about the metaphysics of nation states, especially as these intersect with contemporary questions about human rights, humanitarian law and climate change. In “No Port, No Passport: States without Territory Can Have No Citizens”, *Washington International Law Journal*. 2016, “‘Unable to Return’ in the 1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change”, *Florida Journal of International Law*, 2014 and “Sinking into Statelessness”, *Tilburg Law Review: Special Issue on Statelessness* 2014, my co-author Heather Alexander (UNHCR, Tilburg) and I consider the question of whether a legal entity must control territory in order to be a state (or whether a state may exist “disembodied”). The answer to this question turns out to have substantive ramifications for questions such as: who may be a citizen, and who may count as a refugee. In my work in progress, “Territoriality: The Mind-Body Problem for Nation States”, I develop a normative argument in support of the claim that states must control habitable territory, not only to count as legitimate, but to count as states at all. In my work in progress “Politics as the Art of the Possible: Why “Ought Implies Can” is true for States”, I build on a contention in “No Port, No Passport”: namely that the ought implies can principle is true for nation-states, meaning that these entities cannot assume duties that they are (constitutively) unable to honor. This follows, I argue, even if we hold that no interesting version of the ought implies can principle is true for human agents.