

My primary specialization is the mind-body problem, with a focus on arguments for property dualism that are independent of the knowledge and conceivability arguments, and that draw on both empirical and normative considerations. I also have ongoing research projects in perception / moral psychology, the metaphysics of truth and instantiation, and legal / political philosophy.

Thematically, I gravitate toward empirically informed defenses of humanism. My work on the mind-body problem suggests that the universe contains more than matter and the void; my work in perception and moral psychology suggests that we can be attuned to the qualitative character of the mind-independent world; my work in pure metaphysics seeks to reconcile broadly Aristotelean intuitions with contemporary theories of space, time and matter; and my work in legal and political philosophy builds on the view that states are governed by norms that can hold independently of the positive action of any legislature or legislator.

In the metaphysics of mind, my recent publications include “The Hard Problem of the Many”, forthcoming in *Phil Perspectives*, “Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ Has No Borderline Cases” in *Phil Studies* (2017), and “Mendelssohn, Kant and the Meroteopology of Immortality” forthcoming in *Ergo*. These publications build on my dissertation project of showing that ‘phenomenally conscious’ can have no borderline cases, and exploring the tensions for materialism that follow. Works in progress here include “What is the Refresh Rate of Consciousness?”: an argument (also drawing on the thesis that ‘phenomenally conscious’ cannot be vague) that we can set no upper bound on the ‘refresh rate’ of consciousness: the number of changes in experiential state over time, “Time’s Arrow, Temporal Coding and Phenomenal Vehicle Externalism”: an argument that the phenomenon of neural temporal coding requires either that we abandon reductionism about the direction of time or reductionism about consciousness. A third work in progress here is “Matter Doesnt Matter” in which I develop a new normative challenge to materialism.

In perception / moral psychology, my works in progress include “The Puzzle of Permuted Pain”: a paper appealing to the empirical literature on asymbolia, depersonalization and related disorders of consciousness to muster evidence that there is nothing inconceivable about my pleasure being your pain (though we behave the same). The imaginative resistance we encounter, I argue, is better explained in terms of the *rational* incoherence of an invert responding to pain the way normal folks respond to pleasure. Another work in progress is ‘Painkillers for the Representationalist’s Headache: Transparency about Pain’ in which I develop a transparency-friendly re-

ply on the behalf of evaluativists: pain gives us reason to take painkillers, because painkillers present as diminishing the badness that pain tells us about. A third is “Moral Perception High and Low” in which I argue that pain experience can be a trustworthy form of moral perception — even in the face of sophisticated “evolutionary” objections to the trustworthiness of moral perception.

In pure metaphysics, my recent publications include “Fragmenting the Wave Function”, winner of second place in the 2017 Marc Sanders Prize in Metaphysics, (forthcoming in *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*) and “Indeterminate Comprehension” (*Thought*, 2014). My works in progress in this area include a follow-up paper on the applications of fragmentalism. I also have an older publication, “Truthmaker Explanations” co-authored with Barry Smith. Barry and I plan to revisit the issue of the relation between truth and truthmaking in the near future. I am also working on a paper with John Bigelow (Monash) defending an account of the wave function that incorporates the scholastic notion of a degree of being.

Finally, I have an ongoing interest in questions about the metaphysics of nation states, especially as these intersect with contemporary questions about human rights, humanitarian law and climate change. In “No Port, No Passport: States without Territory Can Have No Citizens”, *Washington International Law Journal*. 2016, “‘Unable to Return’ in the 1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change”, *Florida Journal of International Law*, 2014 and “Sinking into Statelessness”, *Tilburg Law Review: Special Issue on Statelessness* 2014, my co-author Heather Alexander (UNHCR, Tilburg) and I consider the question of whether a legal entity must control territory in order to be a state (or whether a state may exist “disembodied”). The answer to this question turns out to have substantive ramifications for questions such as: who may be a citizen, and who may count as a refugee. In my work in progress, “Territoriality: The Mind-Body Problem for Nation States”, I develop a normative argument in support of the claim that states must control habitable territory, not only to count as legitimate, but to count as states at all. In my work in progress “Politics as the Art of the Possible: Why “Ought Implies Can” is true for States”, I build on a contention in “No Port, No Passport”: namely that the ought implies can principle is true for nation-states, meaning that these entities cannot assume duties that they are (constitutively) unable to honor. This follows, I argue, even if we hold that no interesting version of the ought implies can principle is true for human agents.